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1   Introduction
Redistribution—the transfer of money and benefits from affluent to less affluent market 
participants—requires the existence of non-market institutions through which resources 
are distributed and risks are pooled amongst the members of a group (or between groups) 
(Polanyi 1944, p. 43–55). Redistribution constitutes a gesture of solidarity. It is based 
upon individual group members being prepared to make sacrifices for the good of the 
other members of that group. How much is redistributed within a welfare state depends 
not only upon market income, fiscal policy or upon the way in which benefits are claimed. 
The extent of redistribution is significantly determined by the social constitution of groups 
and redistribution coalitions.
In reference to Thomas Marshall′s differentiation between political, social and indus-
trial rights, in terms of the constitution of groups, two typical models can be defined: (1) 
the ‘territorial model’, in which on the basis of political rights, social rights are created 
by the introduction of obligatory social insurance or of state welfare benefits, thus placing 
demands upon the state which organises the redistribution and distributes and administers 
resources. (2) The second model is a functional model. Here, redistribution takes place 
upon the basis of industrial citizenship, with trade unions implementing social progress 
through social benefits as agreed upon in collective bargaining agreements. The func-
tional model is especially gaining in relevance in the area of pension policy. In a host of 
countries, trade unions and employers′ associations have negotiated sector-level agree-
ments, which finance and regulate pensions (Trampusch 2007).
In comparative welfare state research, as practised within political science, the ques-
tion concerning the extent of redistribution under welfare state policy, and how this extent 
can be explained, represents a focal point of current research. Within the context of cur-
rent debate on whether a retrenchment process is taking place within welfare states, and 
thereby also a dismantling of redistribution policy and solidarity, many studies however 
focus solely upon redistribution, itself based upon the territorial model. State expenditure 
and benefits from state social insurance schemes and programmes are made the focus of 
attention. Accompanying this on the independent variable side is the investigation, within 
the political-administrative sphere, of the influence of actors and coalitions of territo-
rial interest representation. The question is asked whether, and which (party) political 
actors reduce social welfare benefits. Within this context, case-oriented studies concern-
ing reform processes in pension policy have drawn attention to the fact that the party 
effect varies in international comparison.
In this way, parties in the Netherlands and Denmark not only have greater influence 
upon pension policy compared to Germany and france, but reductions have also become 
easier to implement in recent years (Green-Pedersen 2001; schludi 2005; Conceição-
Heldt 2006, p. 192; Green-Pedersen and Lindbom 2006; schulze and Jochem 2006; Pal-
ier 2007).
By means of a case-oriented comparison between the Netherlands, Denmark, Ger-
many and france, this article will illustrate that differing degrees of party effect in these 
countries are linked to differing degrees in the development of functional redistribution, 
in other words of pensions based on collective agreements. When analysing the current 
transformation of redistribution policy within welfare states, undertaking a complemen-
S105How and why industrial relations influence party effect …
tary investigation into both the dependent variable as well as the independent variable 
side is recommended. Not only should the degree of development of functionally struc-
tured redistribution be considered; it should also be investigated what effects pensions 
based on collective agreements have upon the reform process of state-organised redistri-
bution policy.
At the methodological level, this article links the combined application of the method 
of agreement and the method of difference (Mill 1874, p. 283–284; Skocpol and Somers 
1980, p. 183) with within-case process tracing. It is based upon historical-institutional-
ist argumentation. We will proceed in three steps: in the first, for the cases chosen, ter-
ritorially as well as functionally structured redistribution is described in detail using the 
examples of state pension policy and of collective agreements on pension benefits. In 
both of the following steps, on the basis of a two-step country comparison, we will ana-
lyse the relationship between functionally structured redistribution and party effect. The 
comparison illustrates the relevance of evolutionary paths and links a historical analysis 
of paths of political and industrial opportunity structures with current political reform 
preferences. The first step of the country comparison is historical. Beginning with Tho-
mas H. Marshall′s differentiation between political and industrial citizenship, using the 
selected cases, we illustrate the thesis that the chronological sequence of the institution-
alization of political and industrial citizenship is decisive for the degree to which redis-
tribution is based upon the functional principle. In countries in which industrial rights 
were institutionalized and applied before political rights—such as Denmark and the 
Netherlands—functional redistribution models are more developed than in countries in 
which the sequence ran in exactly the opposite way, as in Germany and France. Building 
upon the relevance of the thesis of structuring effects of democratization processes and 
of institutionalization processes of industrial relations, in the second stage of the country 
comparison a second thesis is developed, of which the plausibility is in turn illustrated 
through the combined application of the method of agreement and the method of differ-
ence: In countries in which the functional redistribution model is traditional, and is firmly 
established alongside territorially organised redistribution (Denmark, the Netherlands), 
parties and competition between parties determine the course of the retrenchment of state 
social policy more than in countries in which the functional principle plays a subordinate 
role (France and Germany).
this paper is structured as follows: the following (second) section places this article 
within the context of political science research into the welfare state. Emphasis is placed 
upon studies into party effects and into reform processes in pension policy in the four 
countries. The third section takes each county in turn and describes the pension system on 
the one hand, and pensions based on collective agreements on the other. The fourth section 
sets out the method of comparison. The two following sections then conduct the two-step 
country comparison. The fifth section clarifies why evolutionary paths of democratiza-
tion and of institutionalization of industrial relations bear relevance to the emergence and 
development of functional redistribution, and verifies this using the four countries. The 
sixth section investigates the effects of institutions of functional redistribution on reform 
politics. The seventh section concludes and discusses how an historical-institutionalist 
analysis of the paths of political and industrial integration can be linked to newer concepts 
of incremental institutional change.
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2   Retrenchment and redistribution: a view of comparative welfare state research
two debates constitute the focus of current research into the welfare state, as conducted 
within political science. First, the debate over whether, and to what extent retrenchment—
and with it a reduction in redistribution policy and solidarity—has taken place. Secondly, 
there is the question of which political factors explain retrenchment processes or the 
absence thereof (starke 2006).
for a long time, the thesis of a reduction in redistribution policy and solidarity (van 
Oorschot 1998) stood opposed to the antithesis that retrenchment remains difficult and 
that welfare states can in no way be said to be on the path towards a residual social secu-
rity model (Pierson 1994). In the meantime however, case-oriented, qualitative studies 
as well as quantitative aggregate data analyses have indicated that state social policy has 
experienced curtailments (starke 2006, p. 115). Palier (2007, p. 85) stresses the fact that 
over the last fifteen years, in the area of pension policy in numerous countries, measures 
have been taken to cut state expenditure. From case-oriented analyses on concrete reform 
measures in individual countries, it can be taken that in the pension policies of a host of 
countries, benefits were indeed cut, entitlements restricted and market-based schemes 
introduced (eg. Pierson 1994, p. 15; Green-Pedersen 2001; Korpi and Palme 2003; Palier 
2006, 2007). In the meantime, even quantitative analyses concerning social expenditure 
and the distribution of income in OECD countries regard the retrenchment thesis as hav-
ing been confirmed (Allan and Scruggs 2004; scruggs 2006), even if for example the 
study by Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005, p. 450) has shown that welfare states in the 
nineties redistributed more than in the eighties, which goes against the thesis of welfare 
state retrenchment.1 Despite heated debate concerning how one should define the depend-
ent variable (Green-Pedersen 2004), it is noticeable that the question of reductions in 
redistribution is analysed in particular by means of state social benefits.
If we pass from the dependent to the independent variable side, we notice that in the 
explanatory analysis of retrenchment processes, the relative influence of various politi-
cal factors is often referred to, with the influence of political parties and the competition 
between them as well as the relevance of institutional points of veto receiving particular 
consideration (cf. Huber et al. 1993; Green-Pedersen 2001; Bradley et al. 2003; Kittel and 
Obinger 2003; Korpi and Palme 2003; Allan and scruggs 2004; Amable et al. 2006). A 
point of focus in the debate is the question in how far (party) political actors exert their 
influence, and if they do, whether it is rather the left-wing parties, the christian-demo-
cratic parties or the middle classes and parties representing them who are responsible for 
the scale of state social expenditure, and with it the extent of redistribution and solidar-
ity (cf. in detail Emmenegger 2007; starke 2006). In this way, in their analyses of the 
determining factors of state redistribution policy, Korpi and Palme (2003) and Bradley et 
al. (2003) conclude that the strength of left-wing parties exerts decisive influence upon 
the scale of such policy, and that in countries where the Left is strong, cuts in social 
expenditure are difficult. There are studies, however, which show that social democrats 
1 In their analysis however, Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005, p. 455) do not take into account the 
welfare programme which has remained the most comprehensive in expenditure terms, namely 
that of state pension schemes.
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can conduct cuts in social expenditure more successfully than right-wing parties (Ross 
2000; Kitschelt 2001; Green-Pedersen 2001). Allan and Scruggs (2004) and Amable et al. 
(2006) find that parties of the Right make deeper cuts.
Quantitative analyses therefore centre around the question of whether parties have an 
influence and if so, which parties influence retrenchment processes, and to what extent. In 
contrast, case-oriented studies have highlighted interesting results concerning the coun-
tries in which parties exert a strong influence upon restructuring and in which ones they 
do not; due to consensus imperatives, the party effect is limited by non-party actors such 
as upper chambers or trade unions and pensioners′ associations. In this regard, the Neth-
erlands and Denmark show themselves to be representatives of the former group, and 
France and Germany representatives of the latter. In his analysis of retrenchment proc-
esses in the Netherlands and Denmark, Green-Pedersen (2001) demonstrates that political 
parties have been the driving force behind reductions in social expenditure. He attributes 
this to the structure of inter-party competition. In the case of Denmark, Green-Peder-
sen (2006) and Green-Pedersen and Lindbom (2006) confirm the party effect. Andersen 
(2006) stresses the influence of competition between parties upon pension reforms in 
the Netherlands. Studies concerning France and Germany however show that the influ-
ence of parties is less. In the case of France, Conceição-Heldt (2006, p. 150) and Palier 
(2007, p. 89–90) point to the influence of trade unions and their public protest actions. In 
the case of pension reforms in Germany on the other hand, schludi (2005) and schulze 
and Jochem (2006) have shown that parties are only capable of effecting reforms when 
they succeed in demanding the agreement of the upper chamber and of trade unions. 
Moreover, Myles and Pierson (2001) and Palier (2007) have proved that pension systems 
in France and Germany are difficult for parties to reform as ‘pay-as-you-go’, contribu-
tion-financed systems (which dominate in those countries), combine with veto coalitions 
to offer resistance (Pierson 1994). By contrast, Denmark and the Netherlands belong to 
that group of countries in which a capital-funded system dominates the area of pension 
policy (Palier 2007).
The focusing of the redistribution debate upon state social policy and upon the influ-
ence of political factors is surprising in as far as a host of studies have since appeared, 
which point out that countries in which state pension provision have traditionally been 
complemented by schemes existing at company or at sectoral level maintain these hybrid 
systems in the current transition phase (Haverland 2001; Myles and Pierson 2001; Brooks 
2002; ebbinghaus 2006). Myles and Pierson (2001, p. 330) draw attention to the fact 
that welfare states which developed late, and in which the ‘pay-as-you-go’ system is far 
less developed, and which thus have a strong second and third pillar—such as the Neth-
erlands, Denmark and Australia—find it easier in the current transition phase to extend 
capital-funded pensions further. In her quantitative study on pension reductions in 57 
states, Brooks (2002, p. 500, 516) shows that reductions are higher in countries with com-
pany pension schemes. In the case of the Netherlands, Haverland (2001) demonstrates 
that the multi-pillar system in that country is the result of contingent processes, however 
pension benefits based on industrial agreements are a decisive influence upon retrench-
ment policy. Company pension schemes and pensions based on collective agreements 
indeed figure within current research. What is still missing however, are on the one hand 
systematic investigations into which mechanisms give rise to welfare state restructuring, 
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and under which conditions non-state collective models of pension provision influence 
this; on the other hand, it has yet to be analysed whether and how collectively negotiated 
pension schemes influence the party effect.
If we summarize the body of research into retrenchment processes, we can hold the 
following to be uncontested: (1) Retrenchment takes place internationally; (2) research 
investigates in particular the influence of political parties; (3) even in those countries 
selected for this study, reductions in pensions have taken place, whereby in the Neth-
erlands and Denmark parties exert a greater influence than in France and Germany; (4) 
studies undertaken concentrate upon analysing the reductions in redistribution policy 
upon state social policy, in other words upon territorially organised redistribution; (5) in 
view of the independent variables, the main focus of attention falls upon the territorially 
organized interest representation. In the following sections, we will demonstrate that an 
analysis which includes industrial relations on the side of the dependent variable as well 
as on that of independent variables, represents a useful complement in the investigation 
of retrenchment processes in welfare states.
3  The functional redistribution model through collectively negotiated benefits
As discussed above, the present study, in reference to Marshall, differentiates between 
two redistribution models—redistribution based upon the territorial principle, and redis-
tribution which is functionally organised. Through his concept of ‘social citizenship’ Tho-
mas Marshall (1964) points out that welfare state redistribution has as a pre-condition the 
sequential institutionalisation of civil, political and social rights (‘civic citizenship’ ‘polit-
ical citizenship’ and ‘social citizenship’). In differentiating between political and indus-
trial rights (‘industrial citizenship’), Marshall (1964, p. 94) drew attention to that fact that 
due to collective agreements, so-called ‘social progress’ can be created not only through 
social rights (through legislation on minimum wages or an obligatory social insurance 
scheme), but also through industrial rights. According to Marshall (1964, p. 94), through 
collective bargaining agreements, trade unions are able to establish ‘a secondary system 
of industrial citizenship’—effectively ‘industrial’ rights—which stand ‘parallel and com-
plementary to the system of ‘political citizenship’’.
Collective forms of social security—non-market institutions which organise redistri-
bution—are therefore the result of the use of ‘political rights’ and of ‘industrial rights’. 
Social benefits through collective agreements can be interpreted as a model of redistribu-
tion, offering a lesser degree of solidarity than state social policy, but which nonetheless 
redistributes more than is the case under purely market-based solutions. Nevertheless, 
social benefits through collective agreements do mean less redistribution and solidarity. 
In a system of social benefits through collective agreements, redistribution is no longer 
based upon the territorial principle, in which risk compensation is carried out with the 
help of national funds between sectors, trades and firms, but upon the functional princi-
ple. According to this principle, the productivity of those firms participating in the collec-
tive agreement determines first and foremost the degree of redistribution. This of course 
does not exclude—and which the case of the Netherlands shows in particular—that reg-
ulation by collective contract or by legislation can increase potential redistribution. In 
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functionally organised redistribution, adherence to a collective agreement decides over 
redistributive benefits; in territorially organised redistribution, it is one′s nationality or 
place of residence, or whether the employment contract falls within the jurisdiction of 
national labour and social law, which is decisive. Within a territorial model, redistribution 
is linked to geographical jurisdiction, however not necessarily to nationality. In countries 
in which collective agreements on social benefits exist, a model is thus added to territori-
ally organised redistribution and solidarity, and which is primarily borne by a functional 
coalition between trade unions and employers.
this study will attempt to analyse to what extent collective agreements on pension 
benefits are in place in the countries selected, as well as what traditions exist and the cur-
rent level of development of such provision. Before that however, the individual pension 
systems will be examined.
A common element of the Danish and Dutch pension systems is that a relatively gen-
erous basic pension and standard benefits comprise the central components of the first 
pillar, that of state pensions (Anderson 2006; Green-Pedersen 2006). The Dutch AOW 
system is financed from contributions from all incomes, is organised according to the 
capital principle and is indexed to the minimum income level. The Danish basic pen-
sion is comprised of two elements: firstly from the Folkepension, organised according to 
the pay-as-you-go, financed by taxes, which is linked to pre-conditions concerning one′s 
place of residence and linked to wage growth in the private sector; secondly, from a com-
plementary, obligatory capital-financed system of pension provision (ATP), introduced in 
1964 and in which contributions and benefits are calculated according to working hours 
and not to income. In both countries, the basic pension is the most important type of pen-
sion for pensioners (Frericks et al. 2006, p. 478–481). What is further common to both 
countries is that the second pillar is comprehensive, and comprised of pensions based on 
collective agreements, that is to say of pension provision schemes, which are regulated 
by sectoral collective agreements. In this way, territorial redistribution, as provided by the 
basic pension, is complemented by functional redistribution. Whilst in the Netherlands, 
such collective agreements on pensions have a long tradition, with participation to sector 
pension funds obligatory for firms since legislation dating from 1949, in Denmark (AMP) 
collective agreements on pensions were only introduced in 1991. However, in the 1960s 
and 1970s, Denmark did conclude public sector collective agreements with company 
pension provision (Green-Pedersen and Lindbom 2006, p. 252). In Denmark as well as 
in the Netherlands, the third element, or pillar, of pension provision exists in the form of 
individual, private and voluntary savings schemes.
A common characteristic of the french and German pension systems is that both 
systems are dominated by contribution-financed pension provision, obligatory for all 
employees. For a long time, the French system has comprised three pillars. The first pillar 
does not only comprise the contribution-financed basic state pension ( régime général), 
but also the contribution-financed, obligatory complementary pension, which is regulated 
by national collective agreements ( retraite complémentaire). The second pillar comprises 
voluntary, supplementary company pension funds ( retraite supplémentaire), which are 
capital-financed; the third pillar is made up of private provision (Veil 2004, p. 53). On 
average, pensioners have pension entitlement across 2.8 systems (Veil 2004, p. 53). The 
first and second pillars are contribution-financed. The complementary pension has been 
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obligatory since 1972 and is administered in the private sector by ARRCO ( Association 
des Régimes de Retraite Complémentaire). The German pension system on the other hand 
was dominated until recently by the obligatory public pension scheme ( Gesetzliche Rent-
enversicherung). Company pensions were primarily available to public-sector employees 
and to better-paid employees in the private sector. Through the collective agreement of 
1998, which was concluded in the chemical industry, collectively negotiated pension pro-
vision made its way into manufacturing industry.2 finally in 2001, collectively negotiated 
pension provision was further extended, next to private provision, through the Riester 
pension reform. In the same year, the metal manufacturing sector reached a collective 
agreement on pension provision.
thus in Germany, pension provision is based decisively upon the territorial redistribu-
tion model. This is also the case in France, although the contribution-financed, obligatory 
complementary pension ( retraite complémentaire) is based upon national, cross-sector 
collective agreements, which were concluded for the first time between 1947 and 1961, 
but which also include a risk compensatory element between various sectors (cf. Table 1). 
Furthermore, since 1972, participation in this complementary scheme has been obligatory 
for all employees and companies participating in the basic pension scheme. This means 
that for access to the redistribution model of the complementary pension, the fact that 
employment contracts fall within the jurisdiction of french social and labour law is deci-
sive. Scheme access is not determined by the collective agreement. The aim of national 
collective agreements is much more to take account of the interests of employers and of 
employees. They set down decision-making powers of employers and of employees with 
regard to the fixing of contributions and benefits; however, this takes place across compa-
nies, trades and sectors (ARRCO 2001). This can also be expressed in the following terms: 
In france, the state has co-opted a functional redistribution model and transformed it into 
a territorial one.
thus systems of collectively negotiated pension provision exist in all four countries; 
however, as table 1 shows, these differ vastly in terms of their structural characteristics.
the Netherlands has the most highly developed system of collective agreements on 
pension benefits, and Germany the least highly developed. Furthermore, the Dutch model 
is regarded as a prototype for a high-quality system of collectively negotiated pensions, 
founded upon solidarity, and composed of four collective social mechanisms—conven-
tion, covenants, contractual agreements and coercion (Rein and turner 2001, p. 137). In 
Denmark and France, the levels of pension coverage are also very high.
What therefore are the reasons why in the Netherlands and Denmark functional redis-
tribution enjoys relatively high status, whilst in france and in Germany, pension provi-
sion is based upon the territorial principle? Before demonstrating that the differing mixes 
of territorially and of functionally organized redistribution can be related to institution-
alization processes in industrial relations and to paths of democratization, let us describe 
the comparative method applied.
2 In the case of Germany, we consider the chemical and metal working sectors only. In the con-
struction industry as well as in the public sector, wage-based pension provision has existed for 
many years.
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4   The method: the linking of comparative method and process analysis
In this study, using a two-step comparison, we will combine Mill′s methods of difference 
and agreement, however without following the determinist causal concept linked with 
these methods. In the first comparison, the historical part of the study, we will investigate 
institutional conditions for functional redistribution arrangements (pensions based on col-
lective agreements). In the second comparison, that concerning current process policy 
within welfare states, we argue that the extent of functional redistribution influences the 
party effect during the retrenchment phase. Both of these country comparisons are com-
plemented by within-case analyses of the selected countries. The within-case analyses 
serve to contextualize the investigation historically along the lines of process tracing. 
In this way, it becomes clear that the objective of this comparative study is not to dem-
onstrate causal effects, but rather to identify mechanisms. The aim is not to deduce or to 
falsify, but to proceed in an explorative, heuristic and inductive manner.
the method of agreement and the method of difference can be traced back to John 
stuart Mill (1874). If one applies these methods within the framework of causal analy-
sis, differences in the dependent variable can be explained by differences in possible 
independent variables using the method of difference. The method of agreement on the 
other hand is applied in order to explain similarities between the dependent variable with 
similarities in independent variables. It should be remembered that Mill formulated his 
methods on the basis of a determinist and thus a static definition of causality. Whilst 
the method of difference seeks to identify sufficient conditions for a particular phenom-
enon, the method of agreement contributes to determining necessary conditions. Both the 
method of difference and the method of agreement can be applied in a combined form, 
which not only Mill (1874, p. 283–284) indicated (‘indirect method of difference’ or 
‘joint method of agreement and difference’), but also Ragin (1987, p. 39–42) and Skocpol 
and somers (1980, p. 183). Due to their determinist understandings of causality, Mill′s 
methods assume the absence of errors in measurement, of interaction effects as well as of 
monocausality (Lieberson 1991). The associated advantages and disadvantages as well as 
the suppositions and usefulness of Mill′s methods generally are the subject of much con-
troversy within comparative political science (Jahn 2007, p. 17–18; Lieberson 1991).
Process analysis is of increasing relevance in comparative political science, where it is 
also used as a method of within-case analysis complementing qualitative or quantitative 
comparative studies in a meaningful way. The aim of process analyses is to reconstruct 
processes. Through this, false correlations or equifinalities (several conditions lead to the 
same result) can be detected, the influence of intervening variables upon relationships 
between independent and dependent variables can be examined more closely, and light 
can be cast upon sequential or situative interaction effects (Mahoney 2004, p. 88–90; 
Blatter et al. 2007, p. 157–166). Having been applied over time in numerous forms of 
emphasis, through contextualisation of evidence in time and space, process analysis pro-
vides greater depth of focus. Process analysis therefore has less to do with the question 
of the causal effect, and more with the identification of causal mechanisms. It is not a 
matter of identifying the effect, which can be detected with a dependent variable due to 
the changes in independent variables, but rather of specifying those “recurring processes, 
which link certain causes to certain effects” (Mayntz 2002, p. 24).
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In this comparison then, how should one implement the linking of the country com-
parison with process analysis in concrete terms? Our analysis stresses the relevance of 
evolutionary development paths. We wish to demonstrate that, due to the creation of the 
associated arrangements for functional redistribution, patterns of institutionalization in 
industrial relations and of democratization can serve as historical course setters for cur-
rent political reform processes, and influence the party effect within the present restruc-
turing of welfare states. The analysis does not intend to exclude concurring explanations, 
but aims more at a configurative explanation, which intends to make the relevance of his-
torical sequences plausible. Correspondingly, the choice of cases as presented is directed 
less at analysing particular explanatory factors. The case selection is more theory-ori-
ented, and—consciously—according to the dependent variable: theory-oriented in as far 
as the selected cases each stand for two specific configurations of institutionalization in 
industrial relations and paths of democratization, allowing us to apply and develop further 
Marshall′s differentiation between political and industrial rights for the analysis of party 
effects; according to the dependent variable, because the cases were selected according 
to whether they show a tradition of functional redistribution (collectively negotiated pen-
sion benefits) and whether they show a party effect in the present phase of restructuring. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that case selection according to the dependent variable 
is very controversial in political science, as it is open to the problem of selection bias 
(ebbinghaus 2005).3
table 1 sets out the procedure followed in the two-step country comparison. In the 
comparison between both sets of countries, Denmark and the Netherlands on the one hand 
and france and Germany on the other, the method of difference has been applied in both 
steps. In the comparison between Denmark and the Netherlands and that between France 
and Germany, the method of agreement has been applied in each. To take Skocpol 1979, 
p. 37), the cases have been applied as mutual, configurative contrasts. This means that we 
have chosen two sets of cases, whereby in one the phenomenon we seek to understand 
(collectively negotiated pensions, party effect) can be observed (positive cases, skocpol 
1979, p. 37), but not in the other (negative cases, Skocpol 1979, p. 37). Correspondingly, 
the logic behind this comparison lies in searching for similarities in the independent vari-
ables within the positive cases by applying the method of agreement. We then confront 
the positive cases with the negative set, applying the method of difference. Further, in the 
negative cases, we examine—again by means of the method of agreement—whether the 
independent variables as found in the positive cases do not also appear in these. Process 
analysis has also been applied with regard to two aspects; firstly, this analysis is gener-
ally process-analytical in character, in as far as the countries have been observed over 
a long period of time, and make a two-step comparison—historical and current process 
policy. Secondly, process analysis has been applied in the first comparison, the historical 
comparison, in order to demonstrate the relevance of sequences of democratization and 
of institutionalization in industrial relations in the establishment of collectively negoti-
3 In this regard, the author agrees with ebbinghaus (2005, p. 144–145), who argues that selection 
according to the dependent variable poses no problem as long as one does not seek to general-
ize beyond the cases, but treats the cases as configurations representing complex development 
paths.
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ated pensions. To conclude, we can say that this investigation complements a qualitative 
country comparison with within-case process analysis. In this way, the time factor is 
integrated into the analysis by means of historical contextualization and observation over 
time (Fig. 1).
5  Institutional conditions of social benefits through collective agreements
Collective agreements can allocate social benefits. This raises the question, under what 
conditions trade unions and employers′ organizations establish a system of collectively 
negotiated social benefits. With reference to Marshall′s differentiation between political 
and industrial citizenship rights, the following theses can be formulated: (1) the institu-
tionalization sequence of political and industrial rights influences decisively the extent of 
collectively negotiated benefits (Ebbinghaus 1995, p. 66). (2) Societies in which indus-
trial rights were institutionalized and applied before political ones show a greater extent 
of functionally organized redistribution than countries in which events evolved inversely. 
thus social rights can be institutionalized in different ways, and when analysing socie-
ties′ levels of development with regards to social policy, industrial relations must not be 
overlooked.
According to ebbinghaus 1995, p. 56), political and industrial rights fulfil differing 
functions and mobilise in differing arenas. Whether associations use the political or the 
economic sphere, is influenced largely by historical institutionalization processes, espe-
cially by the way trade unions and employers became integrated within political and 
economic spheres during the course of industrialization, of nation building, or the devel-
opment of states. Where political rights were developed earlier than industrial ones, asso-
ciations used the political sphere in order to realise their social policy demands. This had 
the effect of promoting state social insurance whilst delaying social benefits based on 
collective agreements. If however industrial rights were developed earlier than political 
ones, and associations used collective agreements in a comprehensive way to regulate the 
labour market, then this effectively slowed down the development of state social legisla-
tion. For example, this led to collective agreements taking on a central function in social 
welfare, or expressed another way, territorially organized redistribution being comple-
mented by functionally organized redistribution benefits. Expressed yet another way, in 
reference to Marshall and ebbinghaus, we can argue that the evolutionary sequence of the 
institutionalization of political and industrial rights establishes structures of opportunity, 
which decisively influence the social policy preferences of state and associations. The fol-
lowing sets out to illustrate the plausibility of this chain of hypotheses using the countries 
selected with Mill′s methods of difference and agreement.
from comparative research into trade unions, industrial relations and welfare states, a 
host of indicators can be defined, with which we can operationalize the sequence of politi-
cal and industrial integration (eg. Armingeon 1994; ebbinghaus 1995).
the sequence of the institutionalization of political and industrial integration can be 
‘measured’ using the years in which the following rights were introduced (here I follow 
ebbinghaus 1995): With regard to political integration, the introduction of right to form 
associations, the first year in which at least 50% of the male population was entitled 
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Fig. 1: Combining the comparative method with process analysis
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to vote, the introduction of cabinet responsibility towards parliament, and the introduc-
tion of proportional representation are decisive. For industrial integration, the following 
rights are of importance: the introduction of the freedom of association (right to form a 
trade union), of the right to strike, the year in which the first important national collec-
tive agreement was reached and the introduction of statutory works councils or national 
labour conferences. As a further indicator for the sequence of political and industrial 
integration, we have used the voter turnout in the year in which the right to form a trade 
union was legally enacted. If this is high, then political integration can be said to have 
preceded industrial integration.
If we then compare the Netherlands, Denmark, france and Germany with regard to 
the sequence of institutionalization and use of political and industrial citizenship rights, 
the following thesis is plausible: namely, that a relationship exists between the stronger 
functional redistribution as observed in the Netherlands and Denmark in that in both 
countries, the creation and use of industrial citizenship rights preceded political ones, 
whereas in Germany and France political citizenship rights were used first (cf. Table 2). 
By applying the method of difference, one is able to establish a relationship between the 
differing extent of functional redistribution in Denmark and the Netherlands on the one 
hand, and france and Germany on the other, with different paths of democratization and 
institutionalization in industrial relations.
With reference to the independent variable, Denmark and the Netherlands, each dem-
onstrating a developed system of sector-based, functional pension provision, are similar 
in such a way that with the aid of the method of agreement, the plausibility of the thesis, 
as formulated above, can be further strengthened. The first national collective agreement 
in Denmark was concluded in 1899, whilst a cabinet accountable to parliament was only 
introduced in 1901. In contrast, Denmark had already introduced freedom of associa-
tion (right to form a trade union) in 1849, with in that year, only 4.7% of the population 
participating in elections. In Denmark as in the Netherlands, the institutionalization of 
industrial integration preceded its political equivalent. The first national collective agree-
ment in the Netherlands was concluded in 1907, proportional representation was only 
introduced as late as 1918. When in 1872 freedom of association was introduced, a mere 
2% of the population took part in elections. A further similarity between both countries 
lies in the fact that the introduction of state pension insurance only took place following 
the conclusion of initial collective agreements on a national scale. State pension insurance 
was introduced in Denmark in 1922 and in the Netherlands in 1913. The conclusion of 
national collective agreements however had already been reached in Denmark in 1899 
and in the Netherlands in 1907.
france and Germany, both demonstrating a less well developed system of sector-based 
pension provision, show a similarity in the independent variable, allowing us to apply 
the method of agreement in respect of this group. In both, political integration preceded 
industrial integration. In France, the first national collective agreement was achieved in 
1919, thus 44 years after the reform of parliamentary government. When freedom of asso-
ciation was introduced in 1884, 18.4% of the population already participated in elections. 
Political integration also preceded its economic equivalent in Germany. There, the first 
national collective agreement was reached in 1918, but as early as 1871, 50% of the male 
population was eligible to vote. When in 1918 freedom of association was introduced, 
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49.9% of the population took part in elections. A further similarity between both countries 
can be seen in the fact that—in contrast to the Netherlands and Denmark—the introduc-
tion of state pension insurance was introduced after initial national collective agreements 
were reached. In France and Germany, state pension insurance was introduced in 1910 
and 1889 respectively; the first national collective agreements in those countries were 
concluded in 1919 and 1918.
6  The relevance of collective agreements on benefits to party effect
Based upon Marshall′s differentiation between political and industrial citizenship rights, 
we can formulate conceptual considerations, allowing us to include collectively nego-
tiated social benefits—and with it functionally defined redistribution—in the analysis 
concerning restructuring processes within welfare states. The differing paths that the 
development of collectively negotiated benefits and of functional redistribution took in 
the countries under investigation coincides with the differing paths taken by the formation 
of political and industrial integration. Whilst in the Netherlands and Denmark, where the 
territorial model offers merely a basic cover with standard benefits, industrial citizenship 
rights were institutionalized and applied before political ones; in france and Germany, 
where the territorial model is comprehensively organised and the ‘pay-as-you-go’ sys-
tem dominates, the process was exactly the opposite. As a second thesis, the following 
deliberations are intended to examine whether also during the negative growth phase of 
welfare states, historical processes of institutionalization within both political and eco-
nomic spheres have decisive influence upon preference formation with regard to the pub-
lic-private mix. If so, this could go some way to explaining why in the Netherlands and 
Denmark the party effect is greater than in Germany and France.
As discussed above, case studies show that in Denmark and the Netherlands, the influ-
ence of political parties upon pension policy reform is substantial, whilst parties in france 
and Germany are subject to strong consensus constraints, which limit their influence. 
following on from the differing evolutionary paths that institutionalization in industrial 
relations and democratization have taken in the four countries discussed here (with Den-
mark and the Netherlands bearing similarities to each other as do france and Germany), 
we will now demonstrate that in Denmark and the Netherlands, the preference forming 
of state and of associations with regard to the public-private mix of social security took a 
different path than in France or in Germany. In the Netherlands and Denmark, both state 
and associations define collective agreements on pensions as being complementary to 
pension provision from the state. In contrast, employers and trade unions in Germany and 
France have for a long time given preference to territorial pension provision. This does 
not only lead to them massively resisting pension cuts as proposed by parties, particularly 
since systems financed by the ‘pay-as-you-go’ principle are generally associated with 
the forming of veto coalitions. It is also a consequence that at the politics level, systems 
of collectively negotiated pensions show themselves to be relatively separate from state 
pension policy reform.
For the 1970s and 1980s, a host of studies concerning the Netherlands draw attention 
to the fact that collective agreements on pensions have influenced restructuring processes 
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within the welfare state of the Netherlands (Haverland 2001; trampusch 2005). When 
the Dutch government began introducing comprehensive cuts within its social security 
schemes, employers and trade unions opened up the system of collective agreements to 
social benefits (Trampusch 2005). On the one hand, new benefits were introduced, such 
as industrial agreements on early retirement; on the other, cuts in state benefits were 
compensated by an extension of collectively negotiated benefits. The latter was especially 
evident in the collective agreements on pension provision (Caminada and Goudswaard 
2005, p. 175–176). At the end of the 1980s, the Wages Policy Department of the Dutch 
Ministry for Social Affairs stated: “that the consequences of the reduction in state benefits 
… were largely compensated by collective agreements” (DCA 1989, p. 27). In the 1990s, 
collective agreements on social benefits became the subject of three-sided agreements 
concerning the reform of the welfare state (trampusch 2005). Recently, Cox (2001, p. 
485) has seen the use of wages policy as a means to reform state social policy within the 
context of trade unions′ wage restraint. Further, he refers to the fact that collective agree-
ments on social benefits financed by wage increases are also the result of strategic con-
siderations on the part of the government: “Wage crowding and nonwage compensation 
are two mechanisms Dutch policymakers used to substantially alter labour-market rela-
tions. The brilliance of the strategy is that wage restraint, an idea once used to legitimate 
the expansion of the Dutch welfare state, is now used to justify dramatic curtailments of 
social protection” (Cox 2001, p. 485). Such compensation for cuts in the state pension 
scheme cannot however be only attributed to the willingness on the part of employers 
and trade unions. Haverland′s analysis (2001) of pension policy reforms since the 1980s 
has also shown that Dutch social policy legislation heavily favoured this approach in as 
far as the law stipulates that the first and second pillars together must make up 70% of 
pension benefit.
As in the Netherlands, political parties in Denmark are also able to fall back on col-
lective agreements in matters of pension reform. This serves to expand considerably their 
‘competence’ in pension policy. Moreover, the Danish case shows four special charac-
teristics: (1) the introduction of collectively negotiated pensions (the AMP system) was 
the result of an accumulation of contingent events; over time however, trade unions in 
particular have come to associate a strategic use with it (Green-Pedersen 2006, p. 479–84; 
Green-Pedersen and Lindbom 2006, p. 253–254). Whilst in the Netherlands therefore, 
state pension policy is coupled with collectively negotiated pensions through legisla-
tion, and thus by the state, in Denmark it is of a more informal and contingent nature. (2) 
shortly after the introduction of collectively negotiated pension schemes, the government 
made means testing for basic pension provision more rigorous (Green-Pedersen 2006, p. 
488). (3) Over recent years however, Danish pension policy has followed these cuts with 
relatively incomprehensive ones (Green-Pedersen 2006; Green-Pedersen and Lindbom 
2006). In fact, collective agreements on pensions made the Danish pension system more 
solidarity-based. (4) Further, the evolution of collectively negotiated pensions are linked 
to wage policy, as in the Netherlands (trampusch 2007). Even if therefore in Denmark 
the extension of collectively negotiated pensions, which took place at the beginning of the 
1990s, did not stem from any political master plan, it can be said nonetheless that wages 
policy and the possibility of devolving pension policy into industrial relations must have 
influenced the process of reform significantly. Furthermore, it is notable that ex post, 
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political actors and collective bargaining partners increasingly recognise in the collec-
tively negotiated schemes a usefulness in terms of organisation and reform policy.
As is the case in the Netherlands and Denmark, collectively negotiated pensions are 
also firmly established in France, albeit functioning according to the territorial redistribu-
tion principle. In France, no strategic coordination of collectively negotiated pensions 
and state pension policy is observable either. In contrast with the Netherlands, there is a 
very distinct separation between public and collectively negotiated pension benefits at the 
politics level (Conceição-Heldt 2006). Consequently, the government can only carry out 
reforms to the basic scheme and within the public sector (Veil 2005, p. 26), areas in which 
it has generally to contend with massive resistance and mobilisation potential on the part 
of trade unions (Conceição-Heldt 2006, p. 190–193). Nevertheless, it should be empha-
sized that since the beginning of the 1990s, the government has promoted collectively 
negotiated pension schemes through various reforms, by improving the state′s promotion 
of these schemes (Conceição-Heldt 2006, p. 190–193). Despite this, with reference to 
reform politics, france displays no direct interconnection between state reform policy 
and industrial relations.
As regards German pension policy, numerous studies have made repeated reference 
to the high veto potential of trade unions, as well as to the separation existing between 
state pension policy and industrial relations at the level of reform politics (Hemericjk 
and Manow 2001; schludi 2005). However, change has become evident since the last 
pension reform. Collective agreements on pensions were introduced in Germany within 
the framework of the Riester pension reform of 2000/2001. This was instituted parallel 
to reductions in the state pension and to an extension of market-organised pension provi-
sion. During the reform process, the trade union representing chemical workers, IG BCE 
(Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, Energie), emerged very strongly as an advo-
cate of state support of collectively negotiated pension benefits. The reason however, as 
to why the government took up the option offered by IG BCE can principally be traced 
back to two factors. On the one hand, the later Federal Employment Minister Walter 
Riester had already laid much of the ground work as the then deputy leader of IG Metall, 
with his idea of a ‘wages fund’ to finance early retirement, when, as a representative of 
the executive circle of IG Metall, he spoke for collective agreements on social benefits. 
On the other hand, during the course of the Riester reform, and the wage negotiations of 
2000 and 2001, a wages policy dynamic developed, which put IG Metall under pressure 
to open its collective agreements up to early retirement and to pension benefits, due to 
previous agreements reached by IG BCE.
By applying the combination of the methods of difference and of agreement, we can 
conclude the following: In the Netherlands and Denmark, reform politics show interde-
pendencies between territorial and functional redistribution. Political parties, as well as 
employers and trade unions, use collective agreements at a time of reductions in territorial 
redistribution as a resource for functional redistribution. In Germany and France by con-
trast, industrial relations are effectively separated from reforms to state pension policy. 
furthermore, in the Netherlands and Denmark, industrial rights were used before politi-
cal ones, whereas in France and Germany, the opposite is true. Using the comparative 
method as a basis, we can conclude that the differing evolutionary paths of institutionali-
sation in industrial relations, and of democratization in both groups of countries account 
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for the fact that in Denmark and the Netherlands, political parties′ room for manoeuvre is 
extended in the reform of territorial redistribution policy through collective agreements, 
but not in France or in Germany. Whilst in France and Germany, the preference formation 
of state and associations in the public-private mix has evolved such that employers and 
trade unions give preference to territorial redistribution rather than to the functional type 
(and correspondingly, act as firm veto actors in the reform of state pension policy), in the 
Netherlands and Denmark, functional redistribution is seen as having equal importance 
as territorial redistribution. To express this another way: as political parties in Denmark 
and the Netherlands are able to use industrial relations as a source of flexibility in the 
restructuring of state pension policy, their room for manoeuvre in pension policy is much 
greater than in Germany and France.
7   Conclusion
Within the analytical context of the differentiation between territorial and functional 
redistribution, in reference to Marshall, and by means of a case-oriented comparison 
between the Netherlands, Denmark, france and Germany, this study has shown that the 
level of development of functional redistribution—collectively negotiated pension provi-
sion—explains the strength of the party effect upon the reduction of state redistribution 
policy. As its starting point, our analysis had the following four considerations: (1) with 
collective agreements on social benefits, state and associations can at the functional level 
complement territorially organised redistribution, as guaranteed through state minimum 
benefits and obligatory social insurance. For this reason, it is useful to present considera-
tions as to what extent collective agreements can offer redistribution. (2) The extent to 
which social policy is also organised and financed by collective agreements (or expressed 
another way, a mix of functional and territorial redistribution), is influenced decisively 
by the evolutionary paths of democratization and of institutionalization in industrial rela-
tions. (3) With regard to the dependent as well as to the independent variable, studies 
which attempt to explain the degree of redistribution should include industrial relations 
within their analysis. (4) Increased investigation of employers and trade unions may not 
only help to explain at what point collective agreements regulate and finance social ben-
efits. If employers and trade unions conclude agreements which finance and organise 
redistribution by means of wages policy, this can also have effects upon reform politics 
and party effect within the reform of state-organised redistribution policy.
With reference to the influence as exercised by functional redistribution models and 
industrial relations upon party effect in retrenchment processes, two patterns become 
evident in the four countries examined: (1) In the Netherlands and Denmark, collective 
agreements on pensions are used strategically, not only by employers and trade unions, 
but also by government in reform processes concerning pension policy. (2) In France and 
Germany, the collectively negotiated pension schemes are relatively isolated from reform 
in public pension policy. Through the coupling of functional and territorial redistribution 
models in reform politics, Dutch and Danish political parties′ room for manoeuvre in 
times of pension reform is increased. In pension policy reform, collectively negotiated 
pensions allow them to achieve more than their German and French counterparts. This 
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study has argued that historical institutionalisation processes of political and industrial 
citizenship rights may function as switchmen ( Weichensteller) for differences in party 
effects.
The role and function of collectively negotiated social benefits within the current trans-
formation of welfare states is expected to become the subject of further and deeper empir-
ical analysis. Within the context of the present study, two questions arise: (1) Due to what 
driving forces do industrial relations become an agent of social order in times of cutbacks 
in territorial redistribution? (2) How can a historical-institutional analysis of evolutionary 
paths of political and industrial opportunity structures be linked in a meaningful way, to 
an analysis of current political reform preferences and interests, without falling victim to 
an illusion of continuity?
One way of approaching both of these questions could lie in analysing welfare state 
retrenchment processes as a phenomenon of incremental institutional transformation, and 
in so doing to develop concepts. These concepts would allow us firstly to differentiate 
between institutional change as change by reform and institutional change as change “by 
default” (streeck 2005). In the wider context, they would allow us to define more firmly 
what role politics has in institutional change. Institutional change can simply be linked 
to reform policy. The state accords mandatory authority and besides legislation, makes 
money available. It transfers state duties into the intermediary domain of associations, as 
voter preferences wish it to be so and/or because strategic interactions between political 
actors open up possibilities for this to happen. Institutional change can also occur “by 
default”, however. This means that change can also take place without the mobilisation 
of political resources and political action, as due to historical institutionalization proc-
esses, industrial relations show a predisposition to transfer social security into the collec-
tive agreements domain. Associations make industrial relations the source of institutional 
change. They exploit those behaviour domains inherent to industrial relations opportun-
istically, by regulating social security themselves. Change “by default” means that the 
vested interests of associations and their collective creativity drive transformation. State 
and politics can hold back from wages policy and allow those things to happen which 
happen anyway, and simultaneously be a major driving force in state social policy for 
reforms and cuts. If this is so, collective agreements on social benefits show an interesting 
facet of the redefinition of the relationship between state and associations in the course of 
welfare cutbacks. Collectively negotiated benefits are a surprisingly creative response on 
the part of associations to the exhaustion of the state in its role as mediator between the 
interests of labour and of capital. The solution lies in associations taking over those state 
tasks to which they are particularly suited in industrial relations.
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